The 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, units of the US Army made up of Americans of Japanese ancestry. This is the story of their part in the Battle of Bruyères and Biffontaine as well as the their successful rescue of the "Lost Batallion" (1st Battalion of the 141st "Alamo" Regiment, 36th Texas-Division). The 442nd RCT lost more than 800 troops while rescuing 211 men behind enemy lines.

Those battles is also the climax of the Nisei’s battle against suspicion, intolerance, and a hatred that was conceived in some dark corner of the American mind and born in the flames that swept Pearl Harbor.

Nestled in the beautiful valley. on the western edge of the Vosges. lies the small town of Bruyères. Roman relics found nearby date its origin to the 4th century A.D. Two centuries later, Ambron, son of Clodion-the-Long-Haired, built a castle of one of the four surrounding hills. In October 1944 a new chapter was to be added to the history of Bruyères, one written with the blood of Americans, Frenchmen and German locked in fierce and brutal combat on those four hills and the mountains stretching east toward St. Dié.

The town of Bruyères and points south of it were defended by the 716th Infantry division, commanded by 52 year old artillery officer Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter.

On the American side, the attack was led by the 36th Texas Division. On September 29 1944, anticipating the American assault, the Germans blew up the railroad tunnel on the Bruyères-Epinal line and set the station on fire. On the same day American artillery shells started to fall on the town and the surrounding hills-the first of thirty thousand.

On October 15 1944 the assault began. Spearheading the drive was the 442nd Rgt Combat Team, led by fifty year old Charles Wilbur Pence. At 0800 hours, Lt. Col. Gordon Singles's 100th Btl as well as Lt. Col. James Hanley's 2nd Btl crossed the line of departure. The 3rd then closed in reserve behind the 100th. The 522nd Field Art Btl was in direct support, and the 232nd Combat Engineer Comp played its usual role, lifting mines and reducing blocks so supplies could move. The attack launched on October 15 1944 progressed slowly all that day and the next, consisting of a yard by yard advance in the face of a determined enemy.

The 100th Btl attacked hill "A", the 2nd Btl attacked hill "B", but after a day of severe fighting, the Nisei gained barely five hundred yards by the end of October 15.  

On the morning of the October 16 , the 100th Btl, attacking on the left, had presumably cleared a roadblock. After the battalion had passed on, a few enemy diehards cut loose a blast of small arms fire on the engineer party that came forward to remove it causing five casualties. The engineers withdrew to cover, reorganized, and promptly launched an attack on the defenders, driving them out. They then proceeded with the day's work of blasting out the tangle of logs, wire, and mines that made the road impassable. This was indeed, a new and more devastating war than any of the US troops had previously experienced.

As Companies E and F fought teir way toward Hill B, Capt. Pershing Nakada's engineers treid desperately to clear the roadblocks and mines ahead. But when the two attack companies reached open ground, they were again pinned down by murderous fire from Hill 555 and Hill B. The sam was a fact for the 100th Battaltion on the left. After Companies A and C cleard their sector around Hill 555, they were stopped short at the open valley known as Basse de l'Âne (Donkey Flats). The photo shows Hill 555.

It was to be an all-day effort, through cold rain and relentless German pounding, before Company F finally took Hill 555 withs its commanding view of Bruyères and the surrounding hills. But as an evening mist began to cloak Donkey Flats, the Germans launched a counterattack. It was still raining at dawn, 17 October, as General Dalquist urged his 143rd Regiment, to take Champ le Duc, defended by the Grenadier Regiment 736.

Once again, the Americans were welcomed by an artillery barrage - fifty well placed shells and concentrated machinegun and sniper fire from the stone houses (see photo). A second German counterattack hit the 100th Battaltion just as its forward platoons were jumping off. The Nisei eventuelly turned the tide, but as soon as the lead elements reached Donkey Flats, they fell victim to a German hell fire from Hills A and B and once again the stone houses.

By noon of the 17th , the 100th Btl had advanced as far as the first of four conical hills that towered over Bruyères. The 2nd Btl on the right kept pace, driving back two determined counterattacks and launching an attack on Hill "B," second of the four hills. Meanwhile, the 3rd Btl swung quietly into position on the right of the 2nd Btl on the night of the 17th. The photo shows Hill B from Hill D.

The following morning, all three battalions mounted a battering-ram attack behind a screen of fire from the 522nd Field Artillery Btl and other elements of division artillery.
Hill "A" fell to the 100th Btl at 1400 hours on October 18 1944, yielding more than 30 prisoners, and by the end of the day, Hill "B" had fallen to the combined efforts of the 2nd and 3rd Btl.

Dahlquist ordered the 100th Btl to march east, more than a mile from the nearest friendly troops, and take the high ground overlooking the village of Biffontaine. The men reached the ridge and dug in, but soon they were being hit from all three sides with German artillery, rockets and anti-aircraft fire.
Although they held the ridge, the men were critically low on water and supplies. Five tanks loaded with ammunition and water and accompanied by a platoon tried to reach the 100th Btl. But the Germans ambushed them, killing three and wounding several others. Meanwhile, German bicycle troops attacked the 100th along the right rear flank. The 2nd Btl beat off the attack, but the 100th Btl still needed supplies. Finally soldiers from G and L Companies, carrying water and ammunition on their backs, found their way through the thick forest with the help of the French resistance and relieved the beleaguered 100th Battalion.

Dahlquist then ordered the 100th to descend the ridge and take Biffontaine, an objective that many men thought was tactically worthless. On the morning of October 23, the 100th Btl climbed down and quickly captured 23 Germans, some enemy arms and several houses. But soon the Germans re-grouped. They surrounded the town and blasted the 100th with anti-aircraft cannons and tank fire all through the night. Exhausted, the men in the 100th huddled in the cellars of ruined buildings.

Many had not slept for eight days. The casualties were piling up. Their cache of captured weapons had run out and the supply lines were again cut off. The Germans swarmed among the houses yelling, "Surrender," but the 100th Battalion held the town.

The next morning a Nisei litter train made up of medics from the 100th and the 3rd Btl, along with German prisoners acting as litter bearers, attempted to carry out some of the wounded. The group had barely left Biffontaine, when a German patrol captured them. Only three of the 20 were able to escape. Even today, evidence of the Battle can be found today. On the afternoon of October 24, the 3rd Battalion finally broke through to free the 100th. Biffontaine, a farming hamlet of 300 people, with no rail line, was now in Allied hands. The cost for the 100th Battalion: 21 K.I.A., 122 wounded and 18 captured.

The Vosges town of Bruyères, liberated on 18 October 1944, was less than 45 miles west of the Rhine. Desperate German troops were determined to make the Americans pay dearly for this territory. In recorded military history, no army had been able to do what the U.S. Seventh Army was about to attempt to do: Defeat an enemy force defending the Vosges Mountains. Enter "Operation Dogface." Situated directly in the path of the Americans lie the Foret Dominale de Champ and in October this wood was a cold, dark, nearly impenetrable place covered with fir trees from 60 to 200 feet tall. In some places, little sunlight reached the forest floor - here the forest resembled a dark green cavern. A near constant rain added to the gloom. Numerous fir trees greatly reduced fields of fire - but offered exceptional cover for German snipers. The weather during the last week of October 1944 included a persistent near-freezing rain and scattered dustings of light snow.

"Operation Dogface" in the Low Vosges was a coordinated U.S. Seventh Army spearhead engaging all three divisions of VI Corps: the 45th, the 3rd and the 36th. The tip of the 36th's spear was Company A, 1st Battalion, 141st Regiment.

Leading Co. A, was 28 year-old former Horse cavalryman 1st Lt. Martin J. Higgins, Jr. from Jersey City, New Jersey. Martin "Marty" Higgins joined Troop B (machine gun troop) of Squadron C, 101st Horse Cavalry Regiment, New York National Guard (at the Bedford Avenue Armory in Brooklyn) as a Private immediately after graduating from College, in 1939. After rising to the rank of sergeant, he attended Officer Candidate School at Fort Riley, Kansas; graduating as a 2nd Lt. in 1942. Higgins served with the famed “Buffalo Soldiers” of the 10th (Horse) Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Cavalry Division, until the unit was disbanded in North Africa during March 1944.

Higgins and three other officers, Lt. Colonel James H. Critchfield, Lt. Colonel Donald J. MacGrath and Lieutenant Harry G. Huberth; formed a cadre of officers, who joined the 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th "Texas" Infantry Division in Italy. Lt. Higgins would incorporate cavalry combat tactics into the execution of his missions whenever possible. At a briefing for "Operation Dogface," Higgins learned his orders were to lead the 1st Battalion, 141st Regiment, on foot, up the trail into the Foret Dominale de Champ, move east, and take the heights above La Houssiere. Higgins advised 1st Battalion Commander, Colonel William Bird, whom he greatly admired: "If a strong force did not stay close to the 1st Battalion, a gap could form which the Germans might easily exploit and surround his unit." Colonel Bird took that observation under advisement and told Higgins: “A strong force will follow, move out.”

The goal of "Operation Dogface" was to eject the 19th German Army from the Vosges Mountains and move on to the Alsatian plain where terrain would allow the American advantages of armor, artillery, and air-support to be bought to bear. If "Dogface" succeeded, it would position the Germans with their backs to the Meurthe River. However, in the Vosges, the advantage fell to the well-entrenched German defenders. The rugged terrain of the western Vosges limited the movement of American armor and artillery, while the weather would negate American air support. After the company commanders of 1st Battalion briefed the non-commissioned officers they jumped-off from their line of departure and proceeded along the "axis of attack."

On the morning of 24 October, one platoon of Able Company stayed behind to assist with the battalion command post to be established where Able Company had just spent the previous night. Meanwhile, 1st Battalion 141st proceeded toward the heights above La Houssiere in the following order: Baker, Charlie, Able. Two hours later, Able Company sent a patrol from its 2nd platoon to ensure its supply route. About this time Baker was attacked by two groups of Germans that Lt. Huberth and his men repulsed after an intense firefight. Able Company encountered the enemy in the Bois de Biffontaine, near hill 665. Lt Higgins and his men repelled the German force. The enemy attacked the 141st along its flanks all day.

Later that afternoon, Co. A (minus its mortar platoon) engaged in a fire-fight with a large enemy force, estimated at "Company strength" that had worked its way up the trail from Devant le Feys (further to the south). Meanwhile, near hill 645, Co. B and Co. C, were also hotly engaged. All elements of 1 / 141st had been attacked on their flanks by a numerically superior enemy force, comprised of the 933rd Volks-Grenadier Infantry and the 198th Fusilier Battalion.

With this action, the enemy separated an estimated 270 men of the lead Companies (A, B, C, & the weapons platoon of D) plus their two Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI) guides (Henri Grandjean and Pierre Poirat), from the rest of the battalion. The Germans overran 1st Battalion HQ. This assault overwhelmed the Americans, forcing Colonel Bird and his men to fall back. The Germans quickly set up a formidable roadblock made by felling approximately 80 huge fir trees that fell in interlocking order. They covered the road with "box" mines or "Schuh" mines, and constructed a gauntlet of machine guns and anti-tank weapons such as Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust on both sides of the road - ahead of, and behind, the roadblock. This further isolated the lead elements. The reduction of this road-block would keep the 36th Division's 111th Combat Engineer Battalion and elements of Company C 232nd Engineers busy for several days.

On the evening of 24 October, 1st Battalion learned it was cut-off when litter bearers who had been sent down the trail to the Battalion aid station returned with the wounded and news they had been attacked. Three men from the patrol sent to secure the supply route also returned and reported that Able, Baker, Charlie and part of Dog Company were now cut-off. A small patrol was immediately sent to confirm this news. Two men stepped on mines. The remainder of the patrol returned.

The three company CO’s, Lt. Nelson, and Lt. Blonder decided they would work in concert, and that 1st Lt. Higgins would assume overall command. Lt. Higgins and Lt. Huberth had served together in the 10th (Horse) Cavalry Regiment. Coming up the Rhone Valley, Co A and Co B had fought a number of engagements together. A strong bond formed between Higgins and Huberth during those actions, especially during the Moselle River crossing and subsequent engagements in the villages of Remiremont, St. Entienne, and St. Ame.

Nelson and Higgins had also worked together during the Rhone Valley advance and had experienced some narrow escapes - like the time they were conversing and a German mortar round landed directly between them - but did not detonate. The four officers gathered to confer. Upon seeing Lt. Gordon Nelson, who he always jokingly called "Gene," Lt. Higgins smiled, shook his head, and said: "Well, what now, Gene?"

A successful conclusion to the situation at hand would require teamwork. Lt. Higgins worked closely with 1st Lieutenants Huberth, Nelson, and Kimble. Acting commander 1st Lt. Higgins gave the order to "dig-in," and established a defensive perimeter in a region of the Foret de Champ known as Le trapin des saules. Ironically, Le trapin des saules is Vosgesoise slang meaning “the trap of the Willows”.

As the 141st had been on the offensive since the landing, Higgins had never given this order before while in France. This was the first time they assumed a defensive posture and had to dig-in. The perimeter more or less straddled the trail in a 350-yard elliptical-shaped circle anchored with a 1917-type .30 caliber water-cooled “heavy” machine gun at opposing ends. Manning the two guns would be the ten men of Lt. Gordon Nelson's Weapons platoon of Company D. One gun was under the able direction of S/Sgt. Bruce Estes and the other was under 20 year-old, Sgt. Jack Wilson, a seasoned veteran of the Italian Campaign. The Battalion also had 81mm mortars, but with the dense tree cover (unlike the Germans) had no clear field of fire to bring them to bear. The defensive perimeter bristled with BARs, M-1 rifles, .30 caliber carbines, bazookas, plus the six .30 caliber “light” machine guns of each rifle Company. By forcing the 1st Battalion to dig-in, the dynamics of this engagement changed. Now, the Germans, despite their numerical advantage, would face a well-entrenched American force. The Germans would also forfeit the advantage of their entrenched positions in an effort to reduce the American force.

On the morning of 25 October the "Lost Battalion" sent out a patrol to try and break through the German force separating them from the rest of the 141st Regiment. This patrol soon returned. It was decided a larger, 48-man patrol might succeed. This patrol, under the command of 2nd Lt. James Gilman, of Charlie Company, and led by Able Company's S/Sgt. Harold C. Kripisch headed back down the trail to wipe out the enemy in the rear. They were also tasked with making contact with the mission patrol (2nd Battalion, 141st Regiment) trying to make their way to the Lost Battalion with rations. Meanwhile, 2nd Battalion, 141st Regiment radioed 1st Battalion they were stalled and had encountered heavy resistance from small groups of aggressive German troops. Lt. Gilman's patrol traversed a distance of 1000 yards before it encountered a medium-density minefield arrayed with the dreaded “S” mine, nicknamed the "Bouncing Betty." The "S" mine was a particularly devilish spring-loaded device usually filled with about 360 ball bearings or pieces of scrap steel. S/Sgt. Kripisch who carried a .30 caliber Browning Automatic Rifle, noticed the mines he and his men uncovered on an earlier patrol had been covered with dirt. He spread the word to his patrol to be on lookout for booby traps. 

One "T-patcher” was seriously wounded when a booby-trap set-off one of the mines. The explosion alerted the Germans. A desperate nighttime fire-fight ensued. The minefield plus intense German mortar and machine gun fire stopped the patrol in its tracks. Pfc. Cunningham, who wielded another of the unit's .30 caliber Browning Automatic Rifles tried working his way around to the left to catch the Germans in enfilading fire. In the melee, he and another member of the patrol captured a German soldier. Cunningham remembered how the five men and their prisoner survived the ambush:

In the darkness and confusion we scrambled and took shelter under a ledge. We stayed there - me with my back pressing the prisoner into the back of the ledge - until we were sure the Germans had gone...and then we made our way back up the trail.

Only five men of the 48-man patrol returned - with one prisoner on the morning of 26 October. The rest of the patrol was MIA: presumed killed, or captured. Of those who returned, 1st Lt. Harry Huberth said: "They were lucky to get back to our foxholes." Despite these events, Higgins radioed: “Morale high.” Throughout the day, the Germans sent small patrols to attack the Lost Battalion. Each assault was repelled. On the evening of 26 October the Lost Battalion was ordered to move out and make contact with the advancing elements of the 100/442nd RCT as Colonel Charles W. Pence was directed to relieve the 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry, with one Battalion, 442nd Infantry, and elected to send the 2nd Battalion into the line. They jumped-off in the following order: Charlie, Baker, Able - with Able Company protecting the wounded. In the van, Charlie Company encountered a strong enemy force blocking their advance. Charlie tried to out-flank the Jerries but were stopped by a large mine field. The Lost Battalion was forced to fall back to its original position of the evening of 24 October - overlooking their objective.

Co. A (less 1st and 2nd platoons), Co. B, Co. C, and Co. D had been surrounded and subjected to enemy artillery and mortar attacks for four consecutive days. In this sector, the artillery of German “Group Eschrich” situated between La Houssiere and Vanémont, included a K-18 self-propelled 170mm heavy gun, Nebelwerfer and 88’s. In the Vosges, artillery barrages usually meant "tree-bursts" from German "88s." The tree-burst artillery shell was pre-set to explode on contact with the upper tree branches of the tall fir trees - sending spear-like splintered tree branches and flaming iron shrapnel down upon the GI's below in a horrific seventy-foot free-falling squall of pain. It was said tree-burst showers sounded like a rapidly approaching swarm of angry bees. A fair amount of casualties in the Lost Battalion were attributed to tree-bursts. Men quickly learned to dig deep and cover their foxholes with tree branches and dirt. Inside the defensive perimeter, the "Lost Battalion" reported 28 casualties and three KIA. Higgins and his men had no food or medical supplies. They had run out of rations three days earlier. Ammunition was critically low. They had no clean drinking water (save a contested muddy spring used by German and American troops alike). Unlike the German commander who placed snipers near the water hole, Lt. Higgins gave specific orders not to shoot Germans at the water hole. He did not want the water hole contaminated. On one day a Soldier of the Lost Battalion shot a German who was just about to take water. After he shot him, the American searched the dead German and found poison - so it is most likely to assume that the German did not want to resupply his water but to poison the water hole. The combat range between both sides have been just about 25 meters.

The Lost Battalion had encountered enemy forces at three different points.

To remedy this situation, 1st Lieutenant Higgins, requested an air-drop. Forward artillery observer, Erwin Blonder, sent the message on the 26th, he gave the drop-zone coordinates as 349573, on Hill 651. On 26 October the 443rd Anti-Aircraft Battalion alerted its batteries A, B, C, and D: "at 0800, on October 27, friendly planes will drop supplies to the beleaguered men." The 443rd Anti-Aircraft Battalion had recently, been attached to the 36th Infantry Division. The 141th Regiment first requested XII-TAC send water, K-rations, ammunition consisting of:

- .45 caliber - one case

- Carbine ammunition - one case

- Machine gun ammunition - two cases

- .30 caliber M-1 ammunition - four cases

Radio batteries:

- BA70 - four

- BA 39 - six

- BA40 -six

However, by 1800, 141th Regiment radioed the Lost Battalion that food, water, and ammunition would be dropped at coordinates 344574 instead of the original coordinates. At 2015 Lt. Higgins sent the following message to Regimental HQ: "Small clearing around our position. Will mark with white arrow and, if possible yellow smoke at 0745. Request rations, ammo, cigarettes, medical supplies, batteries. Have aircraft drop supplies so enemy will not observe and inform enemy our position."

The 1/141 got to work preparing the drop-zone. Parka liners, maps, and t-shirts torn into strips made a 25-foot arrow on the forward slope, pointing west. Smoke grenades were tied to small trees and were bent-over to make their detonation automatic. As the planes approached, the grenades would be released - sending smoke wafting above the treetops. At 2145, Regimental HQ informed Lt. Higgins to "launch smoke when aircraft approach," and then radioed back to Lt. Higgins at 2350: "Aircraft will drop supply at 1100 with strong force coming."

Ground Crew Armorer Sgt. Louis Cellitti with the 405th Squadron who rigged aircraft with ammunition for that mission relates:

"Trucks were brought in and the supplies were stuffed into the belly tanks and affixed to the planes to be dropped." It was a point of pride for Sgt. Cellitti that all of “his” pilots came home from their missions safely.

During World War II the P-47 had five different types of auxiliary tanks, of which three were in use during October 1944:

A 75 US gallon drop tank, a 108- gallon drop tank and a 150 gallon drop tank.

As bad as the weather had been during the last week of October 1944 for the men of the 36th Division on the ground - it had been abysmal in the air. Intense fog, near-constant thick cloud cover, and a persistent near freezing rain kept the 371st Fighter Group grounded since 23 October.

On 27 October, the weather was so bad that 405th Squadron would be the only unit airborne, in the entire Ninth Air Force and the XII TAC, in all of France. The mission was ordered only because of the desperate situation of 1st Battalion in the Foret de Champ. At 1045, two flights of eight P-47D aircraft of the 405th Fighter Squadron (371st Fighter Group, 70th Wing, 9th U.S. Air Force; based at Dole/Travaux), one designated "Green Flight," took off for the "Lost Battalion" drop zone approximately 100 miles to the northeast. The planes were carrying two-150 gallon wing tanks, each filled with food, medical supplies, ammo and radio batteries for the beleaguered troops of the 1st Bn / 141st. The flight attempted to fly under the overcast and maintain contact with ground checkpoints. The squadron referred to a mission as “the show.” On this particular “show,” to facilitate the mission, the flight flew "in-string," one behind the other, 2nd Lt. Robert A. Booth, of Oakville, Connecticut, flew "Green Four," in fourth position. As the flight approached Fougerolles, it encountered intense overcast skies.

Green Flight leader, 1st Lt. Paul R. Tetrick, stated:

We were trying to get up through the valley where the dead-end railroad leading northeast from Fougeroles is located. Captain (Gavin C. Robertson), who was leading the section, seeing it was useless to continue further, called twice for us to give it the throttle and pull up through the overcast. Being that we were somewhat "in string" it was impossible to reform and go through (the clouds) in formation, so we went up individually. The last I saw of Green Four (Lt. Booth) was just as we entered the clouds following closely behind Green Three.

Green Flight climbed above the weather and regrouped. This meant switching from contact (or visual) to instrument flying. Lt. Booth failed to regroup with his flight above the overcast. Attempts to reach Lt. Booth by radio were unsuccessful. As his flight would later learn, 2nd Lt. Robert A. Booth, had "spun-in" and slammed into a mountainside at position K-157396, five miles east of the village of Fougerolles. His aircraft burst into flames upon impact. According to the accident report, it is suspected that 2nd Lt. Booth lost control of his aircraft after transitioning from contact to instrument flying - just prior to entering heavy cloud cover. Lt. Booth was promoted to 1st Lieutenant. He earned the Distinguished Flying Cross, 9 Oak Leaf clusters on his Air Medal and the Purple Heart. 1st Lt. Robert A. Booth is buried in Plot B, Row 12, Grave 23, at Epinal American Cemetery, Epinal, France. He was the first casualty of the 405th Fighter Squadron.

Green Flight arrived over the drop zone at 1115, but found the "target" was 10/10, completely obscured by cloud cover with a Stratus base at 200 feet, and returned to base without dropping any supplies. On the return flight, in the restricted visibility, Major Leonard's wing tip struck a treetop. Although this considerably damaged his aircraft, Major John W. Leonard was able to bring his ship home. Green Flight arrived back at Dole at 1235 hrs with parachutes and supplies still hanging from the wings. At noon the weather broke.

Artillery Forward observer Erwin Blonder, with the "Lost Battalion", called HQ to advise of the change in weather: Weather is clear now. Please do something.

Pilot Robert “Bob” L. Griffith, of Woodland, California, recalled the air-drop mission was one of his early missions. It stood out in his mind because he remembered he was concerned, not so much about any Germans he might encounter, but they were going to be flying at a high rate of speed - and the visibility was nil! He recalled they took off in-formation, that is side-by-side, two at a time. He said this was something the squadron rarely did. Many pilots had not done that since flight school.

Early on the morning of 27 October, the Lost Battalion repulsed an assault on their position, from the south, made by an enemy patrol supported by machine guns. The German MG42 machine gun made a distinctly unique sound. Due to the MG42's extremely high rate of fire, between 1400 and 1800 rounds per minute, some soldiers said it sounded like someone tearing a piece of material. Pfc. Arthur W. Cunningham, of Halston, Virginia, remembered seeing one German machine gunner that had been killed early in the assault - his body lay slumped over his weapon for the next four days.

The last transmission of the day was at 1945hrs, Lt. Higgins asked Lt. Blonder to send the following request to Regimental HQ: "Need halazone. Men weak, nine litter. 1st and 2nd platoons "A" not known. 4 killed."

On 28 October, the 405th flew four air drop missions. The first flight of four P-47D aircraft took off at 0750 and was over the "Lost Battalion" drop zone at 0830. German flak was "Intense, accurate, and heavy." They made their drop and returned to Dole at 1047. The supplies floated to the forest floor beneath yellow, orange, and red parachutes. Some parachutes were snagged in the treetops. Two men from Charlie Company, Pvt. Peter Bondar and Sgt. James Comstock climbed a fir tree in excess of 100 feet to cut down the brightly colored parachute material, lest it give away their position to German artillery observers. Some of the supplies landed in German held territory and it was necessary to fight to retrieve them. A fair number of the American soldiers made scarves or neckerchiefs out of the parachute material.

The second “show” was also led by 405th Squadron commander Major John W. Leonard. He decided to try two ships at a time. Major Leonard from St. Petersburg, Florida, was a graduate of West Point, Class of 1942. He was greatly liked by his men. At 1052, Regimental HQ radioed Lt. Higgins: "Two aircraft at one time will drop. Total 10 aircraft." The flight took- off at 1115 and was over the drop zone target only to find it 10/10, completely obscured, turned about and headed for home. As they headed for base Y-7

at Dole, their course took them over Epinal and an encounter with an American M-16 armored half-track “Flak-Wagon”. The M-16 quad-mounted .50 caliber machine guns were capable of firing approximately 2200 rounds per minute. The standard .50 cal belt-load sequence was 1 tracer, 2 incendiary, 1 armor piercing (AP).

Milton Seale who flew wingman for Major Leonard on that mission recalls:

Major John Leonard and I were the first twosome. We were going along fine just under the clouds that gave us 200-300 feet above the ground. All of a sudden, we passed over a small valley, a stream of tracers were directed straight into John's plane. I was too low to get my nose down to fire back at the source, but I did see that it was our own people with a half-track vehicle mounted with quad .50 caliber machine guns. As I looked over at my partner, I said "John, you'd better get out of that thing...It's on fire." John, in his southern accent, said, "Yeah, it's getting a little warm in here. I think I'll bail out." Major Leonard turned his P-47 over and while fling upside down opened the canopy and bailed out. His chute unfurled and as his body disappeared in the trees, I saw the chute pop open then quickly float down to the trees. He could not have been more than 250 feet above the ground when he bailed out so I thought he had bought it. A general's field HQ near Epinal was situated a few hundred yards from where Major Leonard was hanging in a tree with his feet about six inches above the ground. A jeep was dispatched to pick him up.

Robert Lindsay, a Ground Crew Armorer for the 405th recalled what happened next:

The general dispatched a jeep to pick-up Major Leonard from where he landed in the trees. The major found the soldier who commanded the quad-50 gun crew and had a heated "discussion" with him - most likely about Allied aircraft identification.

In the restricted visibility, two P-47D aircraft approaching at a high rate of speed, from the west (German-held territory), and at a low altitude, with similar profile and bubble-top canopies might have been mistaken for two Focke-Wulf 190-D-9 aircraft.

A new plan called for 105 mm and 155mm artillery shells to be filled with chocolate "D" bars, wound tablets, and halazone tablets. Higgins put it this way:

We just crouched in our foxholes and sweated out the "attack" like we would have if the Germans had been shelling us. Those shells may have had chocolate in them but if they hit you, they’d kill you. We decided to take a chance. We figured, if you don’t get hit - you eat. One hundred such shells were prepared for firing. At 1640, guns of the 131st Field Artillery commenced a close-in fire mission. Shells were falling in the American sector. With the radio batteries dropped by the 405th Squadron, 1st Lt. Higgins sent the following message by walkie-talkie on 28 October 1944:

Thank our pals in the Air Corps: We eat for the first time in three days!

With the onset of the New Moon, the night of 28 October was the darkest. However, the next day would be the darkest in another sense. The Germans soon grasped the magnitude of the desperate situation facing the 1/141st and they prepared to close for the kill.

The 442nd RCT point of view to rescue the Lost Battalion

Saturday, October 28th, both Battalions continued the drive forward in the teeth of stubborn resistance and heavy artillery and mortar fire. Casualties went up and up, caused largely by tree bursts, from which there was no escape. Our own artillery was active, and the Cannon Company and 4.2 mortars performed yeoman service, but the Germans were below ground, while our troops were up and moving forwards. Foxeholes still visible all over the place. At the end of the day, the regiment was 1,500 yards nearer to the "Lost Battalion," but only at a terrible cost in men and material. During the night, biting cold and rain kept the men from resting. Foxholes can still be seen today.

October 29th, the sixth day, was the toughest. A tremendous artillery barrage preceded the first assault of the day. The deafening thunder of the barrage gave way to the staccato sound of German gunfire, including the unique sound of the German MG42 machine gun, signaled the commencement of the attack. Lt. Higgins signed off on a letter he was writing to his wife: "Time-out for a while, Marge, I've got work to do." He folded the letter in a square piece of orange parachute and put in his wallet.

Years later, reflecting on the action of that day, “The sixth day,” Lt. Higgins recalled, “The Jerries attacked us all day with small arms, machine guns, and mortars.”

Lt. Joseph Kimble, of Company C, concurred: The Germans were boring in from all sides and we were holding them off with grenades and bazookas.

Lt. Gordon Nelson of Company D, recalled: The Jerries kept coming at us. They must have had some new Lieutenant. He hit us five times and he must have walked away with about two men. Prior to the sixth day, the riflemen held-off the Germans. On the sixth day, however, it was the machine gunners who helped repel the successive waves of German troops.

Pvt. Frank R. Stevens, Company C, of Lynchburg, Virginia, who manned one of the .30 caliber light machine guns on the defensive perimeter, mentioned:

Each day a few Germans would work their way up and we would cut them down with rifle fire...(on the sixth day) we all woke up fighting and went to sleep fighting. When we were not shooting, we were tossing grenades.

Company D Gunner, Sgt. Jack Wilson added:

Unlike the .30 "light" machine guns, the 1917 Type .30 caliber water-cooled “heavy” machine gun had the capability to fire single shot or burst. I would fire single shot so I would not let the enemy know he was facing a machine gun. When Jerry committed to assault my position, I let him have burst after burst.

On the 29th the 405th was right on-target. Two supply missions were flown. The first “show” took off at 1005 and was over the drop zone by 1045. Flight conditions over the drop zone were CAVU (ceiling and visibility unlimited). Fifteen planes dropped their tanks laden with critically needed medical supplies, plasma and ammunition. Major John W. Leonard reported 22 landed inside the drop zone, 4 landed 50 yards west, 2 landed 100 yards west, 2 landed 2,000 yards west. The final supply mission took off at 1600 and arrived over the drop zone V-345573. Seven bundles of supplies fell in the drop zone, one bundle fell off in flight, 2 miles west of Bruyères.

Susumu Ito, Forward Artillery Observer with Company I, 442nd during the breakthrough, recalls seeing the red parachutes on the ground in the Lost Battalion area that had been used to drop the medical supplies. He fashioned a red neckerchief out of the parachute material.

As the supplies started to fall in the American zone they were retrieved and stockpiled. Acting commander Martin Higgins Jr., recalled the air-drop scene:

It was like something you would see in the movies, shells falling with food, planes zooming and dropping parachutes, and belly tanks loaded with supplies -- it was really something. Most of the men cried like kids. You just can't put into words how we felt. I ordered all the food brought to one point for a breakdown and equal distribution. And not one man stopped to eat anything. They brought the food, piled it up, and looked at it. It was the strongest discipline I ever saw. Some of the men had to shoot their way to the rations as they landed near the Jerries who tried to grab them first. We had the same sort of trouble at the water hole. Jerry placed snipers there.

The supplies dropped by the 405th arrived in the nick of time.

1st Sergeant William Bandorick, of Company A, remembered:

The men almost cried when the planes came over and dropped food

Staff Sergeant James Lohman, of Company B, Owensboro, Kentucky recalled:

One pilot dropped food right on target, we were all shouting give that guy a Congressional medal.

One flight of the 405th surprised German troops when they overshot the drop zone. The Jabos strafed and bombed enemy troops seen in a clearing observing the drop. The flight inflicted heavy casualties.

Repeated German infantry assaults pounded the Lost Battalion revealing their great numerical advantage. Each was repelled. The advancing 442nd noted the woods around the encircled battalion were full of dead German troops. The last message of 29 October Lt. Higgins sent to HQ was: “Not trying to beg-off, but situation here gets worse.”

Lt. Higgins admired 36th Infantry Division commander Major General John Dahlquist's aggressive fighting style. Dahlquist was the only officer from Division Lt. Higgins ever recalled seeing at the front observing his troops in action. On Monday morning, 30 October, General Dahlquist ignored the prime military axiom that dictates one never splits his forces in the face of superior numbers. It was a matter of numbers. General Dahlquist ordered Lieutenant Higgins to split his force, leaving the weapons platoon with the wounded and prisoners, while the rest of the men fought their way back to the advancing 442nd RCT.

Higgins radioed he had twenty-two liter cases, eleven trench foot cases, ten walking wounded, and strong German patrols with automatic weapons probing his perimeter. Including the 43 MIA and 4 KIA this left Lt. Higgins with 180 combat effectives. Pondering his options, Higgins also had numbers to consider. If he subtracted an additional 44 men from his force to carry litters that further reduced the number to 136 combat effectives. So, retreat was not an option. Taking the wounded with them was not an option. Leaving the wounded behind was not an option.

Leaving the weapons platoon with the wounded would leave Lt. Higgins with only 170 men to fend-off a superior German force while moving through territory known to have been mined by the Germans. To leave the weapons platoon with the wounded would most likely relegate those who stayed behind to death or capture.

This greatly complicated the retrograde action ordered by Dahlquist, who, upon learning this information, again ordered Higgins to move his men. Meanwhile, German forays into the perimeter were being met and dispersed by artillery fire-missions from the 131st FA, and D Co.’s heavy machine guns. Much like the “Lost Battalion” of WWI, by standing their ground, the remnants of 1st Battalion 141st Regiment, too, had created a salient in the German line. The Germans laid down smoke. The Lost Battalion braced for what would surely be a major assault. However, the assault never came. The smoke laid down was not to obscure the German advance, but rather to cover their retreat.

Late in the afternoon, Weapons platoon "topkick," T/Sgt. Eddie Guy, of New York City, who commanded Able Company's .30 caliber "light" machine gun, observed some movement in front of his position. The "movement" was T/Sgt Tak Senzaki leading the advance patrol of I Company, with Private Matsuji "Mutt" Sakumoto, of the 3/442, on point, as scout.

Private Mutt Sakumoto advanced toward T/Sgt. Guy's position on the defensive perimeter. Sakumoto nonchalantly asked Sgt. Guy: "Do you guys need any cigarettes?" The 442nd had broken through to the "Lost Battalion." Lt. Blonder sent the message at 1600hrs:

Patrol from 442 here. Tell them that we love them!

The 442nd RCT point of view to rescue the Lost Battalion

On October 30, although the back of the German resistance had been broken and infantry action was sporadic, the artillery kept pouring in. Finally, at 1500 hours that day, with the 3rd and 100th Battalions moving as much abreast as possible, a patrol from I Company, led by Technical Sergeant Takeo Senzaki, made contact with the "Lost Battalion." Shortly thereafter, the main bodies linked up. The impossible had been accomplished. After the attack, Companies K, L, and I were down to less than 20 men standing each, out of 200 at full strength. Only a handful of Nisei's that were still able to walk made contact with the Lost Battalion. Of 275 men cut off six days earlier, only 211 remained. "Saying we were thrilled is an understatement," commented Lt. Marty Higgins, veteran of A Company, 1st Battalion, 141st "Alamo" Rgt, who was in command of the Lost Battalion.
When the German Grenadier Rgt 933 was withdrawn after surrounding the "Lost Battalion" and fighting the 442nd RCT, only eighty men remained of a force that had nearly three thousand men three months earlier.

The saga of the "Lost Battalion," of World War II, came to a close. Of the 270 men of the "Lost Battalion," some 211 answered muster on the morning of Monday, 30 October. The unit strength by company was Co. A: 45 men, Co B: 71 men, Co C: 81 men and Co D: 14 men. The wounded were sent to the rear. The rest of the "Lost Battalion spent one more night in their foxholes. The next morning, Tuesday, some 180 men of the Lost Battalion walked out of the Trapin de Saules. They had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and took four prisoners. History had repeated itself. The stubborn and gallant defense mounted by the "Lost Battalion," made possible, by the re-supply efforts of the 405th Fighter Squadron, coupled with the valiant efforts of the 100/442nd RCT, forced the Germans to retreat. The ground so doggedly held by the "Lost Battalion" served as a springboard for the subsequent assault on St. Die and the advance to the Alsatian Plain.

"Alamo Company," Co. A, 1st Battalion, 141st Regt., 36th Infantry, traces it's heritage back to Company A, First Regiment, Texas Volunteer Guard, organized in early 1836 at Washington-on-the-Brazos, as the Washington Guards. Elements of the Texas Militia served with Colonel William Travis at the Alamo. "Alamo Company," had lived up to its name.

Due to the vicissitudes of war, the players in the drama that unfolded in the Vosges Mountains went their separate ways. Among the rifle companies of the 141st Infantry, the average strength now numbered 83 men or less. The men of the "Lost Battalion" were sent into a rear area bivouac near Lepanges for a brief rest and replacement training. Three days later, they would be back in the line.

Colin Wills, a BBC war correspondent, who will be remembered for his stirring coverage of the D-Day landings (“This is the day, and this is the hour”), interviewed Lt. Higgins. The interview was included in the BBC program "Radio Newsreel" and was broadcast from London to New York. It was then re-broadcast to the rest of America from the New York studio of the BBC on 5 November 1944.

NBC war correspondent Corporal Jay McMullen interviewed Lt. Higgins and Sgt. Kripisch for a segment of the popular news program "Army Hour." NBC's "Army Hour," the brainchild of veteran producer Wyllis Oswald Cooper, was broadcast every Sunday afternoon between 3:30 P.M. to 4:30 PM from NBC's studio 8-H in New York The popular show had over 3 million listeners.

Reporters from Yank, Stars & Stripes, and the major news services also interviewed Lt. Higgins and members of the Lost Battalion. The story went nation-wide. During November 1944, the United Newsreel Corporation's newsreel film about the trapped Battalion played in movie theatres across the country.

The U.S. Seventh Army claimed the honor of being the only army in history to defeat a force defending the Vosges Mountains.

On 1 November 1944, the XII Tactical Air Command (TAC) was transferred from the Ninth to the First Tactical Air Force. The 371st Fighter Group moved to Tantonville, Nancy, Metz; and then parted company with the Seventh Army.

The 100/442 RCT suffered 54 KIA and 156 wounded in the breakthrough effort to reach the "Lost Battalion." During the month of October the 100/442nd RCT suffered 639 casualties.

All in all, 161 of the 2,943 men entering the engagement in the forest had been killed, 43 were missing, and about 2,000 were wounded.

There are three main Allied elements to the Lost Battalion saga of WWII:

1.) 1/141, 36th ID
2.) 100th 442nd Regimental Combat Team - comprised of Japanese-Americans with Caucasian officers.
3.) the 405th Fighter Squadron/ 371st Fighter Group, 70th Wing, 9th U.S. Air Force; based at Dole/Tavaux.

Martin J. Higgins, 01030984, Captain (then First Lieutenant) 141st Infantry Regiment, for gallantry in action from 23 to 31 October 1944 in France. When the 1st Battalion was completely surrounded by hostile troops and isolated from other friendly units, Lieutenant Higgins assumed command of the organization and, despite heavy artillery and mortar fire, skillfully directed his men in establishing a perimeter defense. Although the troops were without food and water and were subjected to a series of strong German attacks, Lieutenant Higgins worked tirelessly and courageously to maintain the morale of his men and, bravely exposing himself to hostile fire, directed elements of the battalion in repelling the attacks with heavy losses to the enemy. After five and a half days of continuous effort he succeeded in arranging for supplies to be dropped by planes; and when some of the supplies landed in hostile territory, he personally conducted patrols to recover them. During this trying period his courageous and resourceful leadership inspired his men and kept them well-organized and encouraged until help arrived. Entered the service from Jersey City, New Jersey.

Thanks to my friend Billy Tucci, I got this awesome comic which is telling the story of the 141st Infantry of the 36th Texas Division. This outfit got surrounded by the Germans and fought for their lives until it was rescued by the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.

Billy Tucci tells a saga of Americans under fire in this tale of courage, bravery and the heroes living among us. It's the story to give the 442nd RCT the credit they deserve.

Private Sakato's official Medal of Honor citation reads:

Private George T. Sakato distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action on 29 October 1944, on hill 617 in the vicinity of Biffontaine, France. After his platoon had virtually destroyed two enemy defense lines, during which he personally killed five enemy soldiers and captured four, his unit was pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Disregarding the enemy fire, Private Sakato made a one-man rush that encouraged his platoon to charge and destroy the enemy strongpoint. While his platoon was reorganizing, he proved to be the inspiration of his squad in halting a counter-attack on the left flank during which his squad leader was killed. Taking charge of the squad, he continued his relentless tactics, using an enemy rifle and P-38 pistol to stop an organized enemy attack. During this entire action, he killed 12 and wounded two, personally captured four and assisted his platoon in taking 34 prisoners. By continuously ignoring enemy fire, and by his gallant courage and fighting spirit, he turned impending defeat into victory and helped his platoon complete its mission. Private Sakato's extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflect great credit on him, his unit, and the United States Army. (Text taken from Wikipedia)